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IS IT A CRIME TO LIVE IN PUBLIC HOUSING? A
PROPOSAL TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY TO AMEND THE
AUTOMATIC TRANSFER
STATUTE
INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1989, the juvenile court would automatically transfer
juveniles charged with selling drugs on or near any school property
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts to that of the adult criminal court system.1 In 1989, the Illinois legislature expanded the
safe school zone protection area to include public housing. 2 The
legislature took this action in an effort to reduce criminal gang activity in and around public housing projects. 3 As a result of the
1989 amendment, the juvenile court will automatically transfer
juveniles to the criminal court system whether they sell drugs near
a school or near public housing property. 4 Consequently, the criminal court system no longer treats a juvenile as a delinquent minor
under Section 5-3 of the Juvenile Court Act. 5 Instead, the criminal
court system will treat the juvenile as an adult. As a result, the
juvenile will lose the protection normally afforded a juvenile in the
6
court system.
In People v. Lawrence,7 two black teenagers caught selling
1. 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (7)(a) (1992).
2. 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (7)(a) (1992). The statute states in pertinent part:
The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5-3 of this act shall not

apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 years of
age and who is charged with an offense under Section 401 of the Illinois
Controlled Substance Act while in a school . . . or residential property
owned, operated and managed by a public housing agency.., or on a public

way within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any school . . . or
residential property owned, operated and managed by a public housing

agency .... These charges and all other charges arising out of the same
incident shall be prosecuted under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.
Id.
3. H.R. Rep. No. 155, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statement of
Representative DeLeo).

4. 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (7)(a) (1992).

5. 705 ILCS 405/5-3 (1) (1992). This section defines delinquent minor in

the following manner: "[A]ny minor who prior to his 17th birthday has violated
or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal or
state law or municipal ordinance." Id.
6. See infra notes 31-35 and 73 and accompanying text discussing the pro-

tections that the juvenile court provides a juvenile.
7. People v. Lawrence, No. 92-CR-4907 (Cook County Crim. Div. Jan.

20,

1993), rev'd People v. R.L., No. 75081, 75083, slip op. at 1-8 (Ill. March 29,

1994).
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drugs near a public housing project challenged the constitutionality
of the 1989 amendment. On January 20, 1993, Judge Brennan
Getty, of the Circuit Court of Cook County, held that the Illinois
Automatic Transfer Statute (ATS) was unconstitutional.8 Judge
Getty found the statute violated the equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 9 as well
as the equal protection provision of the Illinois Constitution. 10
This Note discusses the Illinois Automatic Transfer Statute
and the constitutional implications raised by the statute. Section I
sets forth the historical treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice system since the turn of the century. Specifically, this section
focuses on the revolutionary changes that have occurred over the
last thirty years.'1 Section II explores the methods courts and legislatures use to transfer a juvenile to the criminal court system.12
This section includes a discussion of the theory behind legislative
waiver statutes similar to the Automatic Transfer Statute. 13 Section III addresses the standards courts use to determine whether or
not a statute violates the equal protection clauses of the 14th
Amendment and the Illinois Constitution. 14 Section IV analyzes
the equal protection implications of the Automatic Transfer Statute
in light of these standards. This Note concludes Judge Getty properly ruled the Illinois Automatic Transfer Statute is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clauses of both the
United States and Illinois Constitutions. In addition, this Note proposes that the Illinois legislature repeal the 1989 Amendment and
8. Id. Just prior to publication, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the
trial court's decision finding the Automatic Transfer Statute unconsitutional.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Statute does not implicate a suspect classification and thus only needs to withstand rational relation scrutiny. There is
currently pending before the Illinois Supreme Court a motion asking for a stay
of mandamus until the U.S. Supreme Court has an opportunity to consider
certiorari.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The United States .Constitution provides
in pertinent part as follows: "[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
10. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2. The Illinois Constitution provides as follows:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws." Id.
11. See infra notes 36-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
changes in the juvenile court system since the 1960s.
12. See infra notes 55-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of waiver
statutes.
13. 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (7)(a) (1992). This section provides for an enhanced
penalty for any juvenile charged with manufacturing or delivering a controlled
substance under section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substance Act. Id. The
criminal court system will automatically transfer the juvenile from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to the jurisdiction of the criminal court. Id. See infra
note 73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difference between juvenile court jurisdiction and criminal court jurisdiction.
14. See infra notes 80-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
applicable constitutional standards of review.
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return the statute to its prior limited purpose of controlling gang
activity around school grounds.
I.

JUVENILE ADJUDICATION

The current juvenile court systems in the United States 15 are
very different from the system originally implemented in Illinois
prior to the turn of the century. 1 6 In 1899, Illinois implemented the
first Juvenile Court Act in the United States. 17 Other states used
the Illinois Act as a model for creating their own juvenile systems.' 8
These acts emerged as the Progressive Movement' 9 became disenchanted with a criminal justice system that treated juvenile and
adult offenders equally. 20 The result was a separate system that
treated juveniles differently.
However, since the 1960s, the
Supreme Court has altered the juvenile court system to the point
where it only slightly resembles the system the Progressives initially established. 2 1 This section first describes the manner in
which the juvenile court came into existence. This section also describes the juvenile court system as it existed until the Supreme
Court implemented its changes in the 1960s. Lastly, this section
discusses the current juvenile court system.
A.

Pre-1960s

Prior to the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 and its counterparts, the criminal justice system made no distinction between
adults and juveniles. 2 2 The only exception the common law made
was that a child under the age of seven could not have the requisite
mental intent necessary to commit a crime. 2 3 Therefore, anyone
15. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructuring
the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1083 n.1 (1991) (stating all 50 states and the District of Columbia have juvenile
courts and providing a listing of the Statute for each).
16. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 132.
17. Id.
18. Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1096 (indicating that within 20 years of
the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, all but three states had a similar system in
place).
19. The Progressive Movement began as a response to a changing America
at the turn of the century. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile

Court, 75 MiNN. L. REV. 691, 693 (1991). The urban middle-class created state
agencies that would alleviate social ills. Id. The agencies corrected these social
ills by imposing middle-class values upon the poor and upon immigrants. Id.
20. Id. See also Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1095-96 (discussing other effects of the Progressive Movement, such as the enforcement of compulsory
school attendance laws and the enactment of child labor laws).
21. See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of Supreme Court decisions on juvenile court proceedings.
22. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (stating that at common law, a child
that reached the age of seven years was subject to the same treatment as adult
offenders).

23. Id.
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under seven years old was not accountable for their criminal behavior. However, the common law assumed that anyone over seven
years of age was capable to form the intent necessary to commit a
crime. 2 4 As a result, the common law treated every offender over
the age of seven identically.
At the turn of the century, Progressive reformers rejected the
rigidity courts used to deal with the conduct of children. 25 The reformers envisioned a juvenile court system that focused on the offender rather than the offense committed. 26 In addition, the
reformers desired a system that focused on the best interests of the
offender. 2 7 The reformers believed an informal court system that
de-emphasized the procedural aspects of the criminal justice system could best accomplish this task.2 8 Accordingly, this new juvenile court system ignored many of the procedural aspects often
considered to be constitutionally mandated. 2 9 The courts rationalized the elimination of the procedural obstacles by claiming it was
30
in the best interest of all juveniles.
The new juvenile court system produced an unprecedented relationship between the offender and the court. In order to shield
3
the juvenile, the court system labeled the offender a delinquent '
when he committed an offense rather than labeling him a criminal.
Additionally, the state acted as Parens Patri 32 rather than an ad24. Id.
25. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice Between Rules and
Standards, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 351, 352 (indicating that juvenile court systems

were a rejection of the rigidity of the manner in which criminal courts dealt

with children).
26. Id. at 360-61. Teitelbaum discusses the idea of the juvenile court foun-

ders that the system could be individualized whereby a juvenile judge would
look to the best interest of the child and not his actions. Id.

27. See Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on
Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NoTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 324-27 (1991), for a discussion of the original goals of
the juvenile court system.
28. Id. at 327-31. Forst and Blomquist address the lack of due process
rights afforded juveniles as compared to adults and changes made by the
Supreme Court to extend those rights to juveniles. Id.
29. See Teitelbaum, supra note 25, at 363. Specifically, notice of charges
were often oral. Id. For the most part, counsel was not present in most proceedings. Id. Most strikingly, the privilege against self-incrimination was not
followed since the proceedings were non-criminal and an important aspect of
the system was the interplay between the judge and the juvenile. Id.
30. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
31. Illinois Juvenile Court Act § 1, 1899 Ill. Laws 132. Under this Act, a
delinquent minor included "any child under the age of 16 years who violates
any law of this State or any city or village ordinance." Id. See also Juvenile
Court Act of 1987, 705 ILCS 405/5-3 (1) (1992). See also Teitelbaum, supra note
25, at 362 (stating that under many juvenile codes, a court could not find that a
juvenile was delinquent unless the juvenile committed an act which would be a
crime in the jurisdiction and he was in need of care or supervision).
32. Parens Patri is defined in the following manner: "'Parent of the country,' refers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of
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versary. Moreover, the adjudication proceedings were more civil in
nature than criminal. 3 3 In effect, the state focused on the best interests of the child. 3 4 Thus, the system sought to rehabilitate the

3
juvenile, not punish him.

5

B.

Post-1960s

In the early 1960s, criticism of the informal juvenile proceedings began to mount. 36 Modern reformers argued the juvenile system was replete with punitive aspects similar to those of the
criminal system. 3 7 For example, the system empowered juvenile
court judges with wide discretion, 38 including the power to incarcerate the juvenile. 39 Accordingly, critics realized there was no real
difference between incarcerating a juvenile delinquent and a crimi40
nal adult.
In 1967, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of incarcerating a juvenile in In re Gault.4 1 In that case, a fifteen-year-old juvenile allegedly made lewd phone calls to a neighbor. 42 As a result, a
Gila County Arizona sheriff took the juvenile into custody. 43 At the
persons under legal disability . . . ." BLACiK's LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed.
1990). Courts used this doctrine to justify their intervention into the life of the
child. See Feld, supra note 19, at 695.
33. The idea of treating juvenile proceedings as civil matters emerged because of the many types of children the juvenile court systems handled. Feld,
supra note 19, at 695. The court handled children who were abused, neglected
or dependent. Id. It also handled those who were charged with criminal offenses. Id.
34. See supra note 25-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
goals of the juvenile court system.
35. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in
American Juvenile Justice:In Defense of DiscretionaryWaiver, 5 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 267 (1991) (indicating that the underlying purpose of
the juvenile court system is to help the juvenile that comes before the court
rather than to punish him).
36. See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 27, at 327-30 (discussing the criticism that arose in the 1960s and 1970s regarding the juvenile court system).
37. Id.
38. See Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1099 (stating the legislature gave
judges almost limitless discretion when it allowed them to create dispositions
which were tailored toward a particular individual).
39. See Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 132. The act states in
pertinent part: "If the child is found guilty of any criminal offense, and the
judge is of the opinion that the best interest requires it, the court may commit
the child to any institution . . . ." Id.
40. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27. In discussing the incarceration of a juvenile,
Justice Abe Fortas noted: "[T]he boy is committed to an institution where he
may be restrained of liberty for years .... [H]owever euphemistic the title, a
'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The Court does not state exactly what the juvenile said to the neighbor. Id. at 4. However, the Court does note that the comments were of the
adolescent, sex variety. Id.
43. Id.
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subsequent juvenile court hearing, the judge ignored many due process rights of the juvenile. 4 4 The judge ruled the juvenile was a
delinquent and committed him to the State Industrial School until
the delinquent reached the age of twenty-one. 4 5 The Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the juvenile court judge and stressed
that courts must adhere to due process requirements when the pos46
sibility of incarcerating the juvenile exists.

In part, the Gault Court based its decision on the earlier
Supreme Court case of Kent v. United States.47 The Court in Kent
specifically dealt with a situation in which a juvenile court judge
used his discretionary powers 48 to waive jurisdiction and transfer a
fourteen-year-old juvenile to the criminal court. 4 9 As in Gault, the
juvenile argued that waiver of jurisdiction violated the due process
rights of the juvenile.50 The Court acknowledged that "waiver of
jurisdiction is a critically important action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile". 51 Thus, the Court deter44. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1. At the time authorities arrested the juvenile
for making lewd phone calls, they did not inform his parents that he had been

taken into custody. Id. at 5. Neither the juvenile defendant nor his parents

received formal notice of a hearing. Id. at 6. Instead, they received a short note
on plain paper telling them of the time of the hearing. Id. The juvenile judge
held the hearing in his chambers without the presence of an attorney for the
juvenile. Id. at 5. At this hearing the juvenile revealed self-incriminating evidence since he had never been advised of his privilege to not reveal the information. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 10. Since the complaining witness was not
present, the court did not allow the juvenile to confront and cross-examine her.
Id. at 7. The court used the unsworn hearsay testimony of a probation officer
who had spoken to the complaining witness. Id. Lastly, the court did not record the hearing and, therefore, during the habeas corpus appeal, all testimony
came from the memories of the trial participants. Id. at 10.
45. In re Gault,387 U.S. at 10. The irony of the Gault decision is that if the
juvenile defendant had been an adult when he committed the same offense, the
maximum punishment would have been a fine of $5.00 to $50.00 or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months. Id. at 29.
46. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights protect children
as well as adults. Id. at 13. As a result, the Court specifically held a juvenile
cannot be found delinquent and ordered to state institution based on unsworn
testimony not subjected to cross-examination. Id. at 57.
47. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
48. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial
waiver.
49. Kent, 383 U.S. at 542.
50. Id. at 562. The police arrested the juvenile defendant for housebreaking, robbery, and rape. Id. at 542. The attorney for the defendant knew the
prosecution would ask to have the juvenile court waive jurisdiction. Id. at 544.
In order to prepare for the waiver motion, the attorney filed a separate motion
to allow him access to the Social Service file of the defendant. Id. at 546. The
agency had created the file when the court previously placed the defendant on
probation. Kent, 383 U.S. at 546. The attorney also motioned the court to order
psychiatric care for the juvenile under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Id.
at 545. The juvenile court judge did not make any specific rulings on the motions, nor did he conduct a hearing or state a reason for his decision to waive
jurisdiction. Id. at 546.
51. Id. at 556.
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mined that when such an important issue is at stake,5 2 a juvenile is
entitled to constitutional due process protection. 5 3 However, the
Court did not discard the use of waiver statutes since it believed
waiver statutes are designed to subject a juvenile to the procedures
of the criminal court. 54 The next section describes the types of
waiver available and how the courts implement them.
II.

WAIVER STATUTES

Statutory provisions excluding some offenders from the protection of juvenile courts have always existed.55 The legislators of various states enacted waiver statutes since they did not consider the
punitive powers of juvenile courts to be strong enough in some
cases.5 6 To address these situations, legislatures gave judges discretion to waive jurisdiction in cases where they thought the criminal system was more suitable to handling the juvenile offender.5 7
Furthermore, legislatures explicitly denied jurisdiction to the juvenile court when a juvenile had been charged with certain offenses.5 8
These provisions reflected the realization that, at times, the goals of
the juvenile system5 9 were subordinate to the protection of society
as a whole. This section will explain the different types of waiver.
First, this section will discuss judicial waiver. Judicial waiver allows judges the discretion to make the waiver decision on a case-bycase basis. Second, this section will describe legislative waiver.
Legislative waiver occurs when the legislature itself makes a
waiver decision and denies this power to judges.

52. There is a great difference between juvenile court jurisdiction and criminal court jurisdiction in Kent. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557. If the juvenile court

determined the defendant was delinquent, the maximum punishment would
have been five years in a state institution. Id. Under the criminal law, a court
could have sentenced the defendant to death. Id.
53. Kent, 383 U.S. at 561-62.
54. Id. at 565.

55. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to
Criminal Court:A Case Study and Analysis of ProsecutorialWaiver, 5 NOTRE

J.L. ETlcs & PUB. POL'Y 281 (1991) (noting that even the adamant proponents of the juvenile court system realized certain individuals could not be
DAME

rehabilitated and that society must be protected from these individuals).
56. See Zimring, supra note 35, at 276 (stating the justification behind all
waiver decisions is that the maximum punishment under juvenile court laws is
not harsh enough for certain situations).
57. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text discussing judicial waiver.
58. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text discussing legislative
waiver.
59. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
goals of the juvenile court system.
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A. Judicial Waiver
There are two methods 60 in which a juvenile court may transfer an offender to the jurisdiction of an adult criminal court. 61 The
first method involves the use of judicial waiver. 62 Judicial waiver
occurs when a juvenile court judge determines the individual before
him should have his case heard in the criminal court. 6 3 Although
at one time a juvenile court judge practically had unlimited discretion, 64 the Supreme Court has recently imposed standards to act as
a guide for juvenile court judges. 6 5 Thus, while juvenile court
judges still have the power to waive jurisdiction, statutes now incorporate criteria for judges to consider when making their
decisions.
66
However, critics argue judicial waiver is still too arbitrary.
Current statutes list a number of criteria that a judge should take
60. A third type of waiver provision, the prosecutorial waiver, exists in thirteen states. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 55, at 284-85. The legislature allows
for concurrent jurisdiction in juvenile and criminal courts. Id. at 285. The
prosecutor decides in which forum the case will be heard. Id. The prosecutor is
often given great discretion in making this decision since he must only adhere
to certain vague guidelines. Id.
One of the main problems people find with this type of waiver is that prosecutors historically have been more interested in retribution than rehabilitation.
Id. at 283. Thus, quite often, the goals of the juvenile system are not taken into
consideration. Id. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, this process is carried
out without a hearing, counsel for the juvenile, or any statement for the reason
behind the decision. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 55, at 287-88. In Florida,
when the legislature amended its prosecutorial waiver statute to allow for more
prosecutorial discretion, the percentage of cases transferred to criminal court
jumped from 2.83% to 8.85% in a single year. Id at 288. However, for purposes
of this Note, prosecutorial waiver is not discussed since it does not exist in
Illinois.
61. See Feld, supra note 19, at 701-08 (discussing judicial and legislative
waiver).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (1992).
64. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 552-53; Feld, supra note 19, at 704-05 (discussing
the great amount of discretion accorded juvenile court judges in making decisions as to whether jurisdiction should be waived).
65. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67. The Court listed eight factors a judge should
consider in deciding whether jurisdiction should be waived. Id. First, a judge
should consider the seriousness of the alleged offense, including whether the
juvenile used violence. Id. Second, the judge should determine if the juvenile
committed the alleged offense "in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful
manner" against a person. Id. Third, the judge should consider whether the
offense was against a person or against property. Fourth, the judge should
consider the strength of the evidence against the juvenile. Id. at 567. Fifth, the
court should also determine whether there are co-defendants who are adults
and will be tried in the criminal court. Id. Sixth, the judge should take into
consideration the maturity of the juvenile as well as the previous history of the
juvenile. Id. The judge should also consider the record and previous history of
the juvenile. Lastly, the judge should consider the protection of society and the
likelihood of rehabilitating the juvenile. Id.
66. See Feld, supra note 19, at 704 (arguing that the Court's decision in
Kent did not curb judicial discretion).
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into account when making a waiver decision.6 7 The critics assert
the list merely reinforces the discretion of juvenile court judges
since they may place more emphasis on one factor over another to
justify a waiver decision.68 In order to curb the perceived abuse of
discretion and arbitrariness, legislatures have passed laws that automatically remove youthful offenders from the jurisdiction of the
69
juvenile court.
B. Legislative Waiver
The second method in which a juvenile court may transfer an
offender to the jurisdiction of an adult criminal court is legislative
waiver. 70 Legislative waiver occurs when a legislature enacts a law
that automatically transfers any juvenile who commits a certain offense to the criminal court. 7 1 The legislature completely removes
the discretion a juvenile court judge normally possesses. As a result, the courts will subject the child offender to the same trial an
adult would receive. 72 Consequently, the juvenile court system automatically transfers the juvenile to the criminal court system
where the juvenile will lose the benefits customarily afforded a ju73
venile offender.
67. See, e.g., 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (3)(b) (1992). The act provides that a judge

should consider the following factors when determining the question ofjurisdic-

tional waiver:
(i) whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a grand jury may be
expected to return an indictment; (ii) whether there is evidence that the
alleged offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner;
(iii) the age of the minor; (iv) the previous history of the minor; (v) whether
there are facilities particularly available to the Juvenile Court for the
treatment and rehabilitation of the minor; (vi) whether the best interest of
the minor and the security of the public may require that the minor continue in custody or under supervision for a period extending beyond his
minority; (vii) whether the minor possessed a deadly weapon when committing the alleged offense.
Id.
68. See Feld, supra note 19, at 704 (arguing the criteria placed in statutes
following the decision of the Unites States Supreme Court in Kent actually reinforces the discretion granted to judges); see also Teitelbaum, supra note 25, at
399 (stating judicial waiver statutes have been compared to death penalty statutes due to the lack of objective standards).
69. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislative waiver.
70. See generally Feld, supra note 19, at 703-09 (discussing judicial and legislative waiver).
71. See, e.g., 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (6)(a) (1992). The statute provides that any
minor who is at least fifteen years of age and is charged with first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or armed robbery involving the use of a
firearm will automatically be prosecuted under the Criminal Code. Id.
72. See Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1112. The removal of discretion on the
part of the juvenile court distinguishes legislative waiver from judicial waiver.

Id.
73. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The Court listed a number
of rights given to juveniles under the juvenile system which are not present
under the criminal system. Id. at 556-57. Although the rights vary by jurisdic-
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The principal attribute distinguishing legislative waiver from
judicial waiver is the lack of discretion the legislature provides
judges in the juvenile court system. 7 4 Thus, some critics argue legislative waiver is the best alternative.7 5 However, others insist the
lack of discretion is the main drawback. 76 The focus invariably
changes from the offender to the offense and from rehabilitation to
retribution.77 The rehabilitative function of the juvenile court system erodes, and the distinction between the juvenile court system
and the criminal court system disappears. Some commentators
even advocate abolishing the juvenile court system entirely.78 This
position would bring the criminal justice system full circle to where
79
it was prior to the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899.
This section and the preceding one addressed the movement of
the juvenile court system from the turn of the century to the present. The sections also discussed the means a judge or legislature
may use to transfer the juvenile to the criminal court system. In
addition, these sections focused on the severe impact a transfer can
have on an individual. The next section shifts the emphasis from
the distinction between juvenile and adult court systems to the
standards a court will use to determine whether a statute violates
the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and
the Illinois Constitution.
III.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Illinois Courts assess equal protection claims brought under
either the United States or Illinois Constitutions according to the
same analytical standards.8 0 Therefore, Illinois courts follow the
tion, statutes generally shield the juvenile from publicity. Id. at 556. Although
the court may confine the juvenile, under most circumstances, the court will not
confine the juvenile with adults. Id. Upon adjudication, the court may detain
the juvenile, but only until he is twenty-one years of age. Id. As opposed to an
adult conviction, the juvenile will not lose his civil rights. Id. In addition, the
adjudication will not be used against him at a later date. Id. As an added
benefit, he will also not be disqualified from obtaining public employment. Id.
at 557.
74. Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1112.
75. See Zimring, supra note 35, at 269.
76. See generally Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1112 (stating that automatic
transfer statutes represent a complete rejection of the underlying juvenile court
philosophy).

77. The whole concept underlying legislative waiver statutes is that for certain offenses, the jurisdiction of a juvenile court jurisdiction is waived regardless of the age of the offender. Id.
78. See id. at 1112 (arguing that the child-adult dichotomy which served as
the basis for the juvenile court movement at the turn of the century is no longer
valid and, therefore, no reason exists to continue using the separate systems).
79. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
criminal justice system prior to the creation of juvenile court systems.
80. People v. Clark, 565 N.E.2d 1373, 1376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (stating that
both the Unites States and Illinois Constitutions employ the same analysis in
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standards established by the United States Supreme Court in equal
protection cases brought under both the Illinois Constitution as
well as the United States Constitution. 8 ' Any discussion of judicial
review under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution will apply equally to the equal protection provision of the
Illinois Constitution.8 2 This section discusses the standards courts
employ when addressing equal protection claims.
A court will apply one of two tests to assess potential equal protection violations. 8 3 The first test is the rational basis test. A court
will apply the rational basis test when deciding a case that does not
involve a fundamental right or a suspect classification.8 4 However,
a court will apply a more stringent standard, the strict scrutiny
test,8 5 whenever an issue involves a fundamental right8 6 or the
deciding whether the equal protection rights of a defendant were violated in the
context of first and second degree murder charges).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). However,
some have suggested that courts actually use a three-tier approach. Collins v.
Schwitzer, 774 F. Supp. 1253, 1261 (D. Idaho 1991). Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall believed that the Court did have an intermediate scrutiny
standard. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing numerous cases where the Court noticed legislative goals and means even though the interest involved would not
have given rise to the application of strict scrutiny). Courts analyze classifications based on gender or illegitimacy under the intermediate scrutiny standard.
High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that classifications based on homosexuality are not protected under the heightened standard, but under the rational basis standard).
Justice Marshall thought the Supreme Court should come right out and say
there are three standards, not two. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 318 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing lower courts would be able to rule on equal protection questions more effectively if the standards were clearer). The intermediate group
has been labelled quasi-suspect and defined as a group that has some of the
qualities of a suspect class but does not quite meet all of the requirements. See
Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications:On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 937, 948 (1991) (arguing that
homosexuals should at least be protected by the intermediate standard, if not
the strict scrutiny standard).
Justice Stevens believed that there were no clear set of standards used by
the Court. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring). Instead, Justice Stevens believed the Court uses a
continuum to decide cases based on different classifications. Id. If anything,
the Court should apply one standard, the rational basis standard. Id. However, if a law classifies a group based on race, the law will not be upheld since it
is not rational to classify on the basis of race. Id. at 453. Similarly, when a law
classifies based on gender, the state will have a difficult time showing that gender is relevant to a relevant state purpose. Id. at 454.
84. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text for discussion of the rational basis test.
85. See infra notes 101-20 and accompanying text for discussion of the
strict scrutiny standard.
.86. See infra note 104 for a discussion of fundamental rights.
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presence of a suspect classification.8 7 However, the classification
does not have to be overt.8 8 If a court believes that a legislature
enacted a neutral statute with an underlying discriminatory motive, the court must apply the strict scrutiny test.8 9 The test a court
applies will almost always determine whether or not the statute is
constitutional. 90
A.

The Rational Basis Standard

As a general rule, courts presume statutes are constitutional. 9 '

Additionally, courts will not find a statute unconstitutional simply
because it classifies people or draws lines.9 2 In fact, almost all statutes involve some degree of classifying. 9 3 Courts provide legislatures with this deference even if a court believes the legislature
erred in passing the law. 94 Courts take the position that the democratic process will correct certain legislative mistakes. 9 5 Thus, judicial intervention is not needed. 96 Consequently, legislative action
need not be perfect so long as there is a rational basis for the
97
action.
Once a court determines that a fundamental right or a suspect
classification is not at issue, the court will then decide whether the
legislature had a rational basis for enacting the statute. 98 A court
will give wide discretion to legislatures to find that a statute is rational rather than arbitrary or irrational. 99 Courts will allow legislatures to attack only some part, but not all of a problem. 10 0
87. See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text for discussion of suspect
classifications.

88. 2

ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw SUBSTANCE AND

PROCEDURE
89. Id.

18.4 (1986).

90. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that every statute except one that was subjected to strict scrutiny was found unconstitutional, whereas only one classification subject to the rational basis test was found irrational).

91. Faircloth v. Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 516 (4th Cir. 1991).
92. 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 88, 18.2.
93. Id.
94. N.Y. State Club Ass'n. v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 17 (1988) (finding the
appellant failed to meet the burden of showing the legislative classification had
no reasonable support in fact).
95. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (stating court should not intervene even though it believes a political branch has acted unwisely).
96. Id.
97. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970) (stating that ifa classification is reasonable, it does not have to be made with "mathematical nicety").
98. American Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1511 (7th Cir. 1992);
U.S. v. Doyan, 909 F.2d 412, 416 (10th Cir. 1990); People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d
637, 642 (Ill. 1991); City of Batavia v. Allen, 578 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991).
99. McLaughlin v. State of Fla., 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
100. Id. at 191. See also ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 88, $ 18.2 (discussing
the differences between over-inclusive and under-inclusive laws); Joseph Tuss-
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However, the test courts employ changes when a statute affects a
fundamental right' 01 or involves a suspect classification. 10 2 Under
those circumstances, the statute must pass the strict scrutiny
standard.103
B.

The Strict Scrutiny Standard

When legislation affects a fundamental right 10 4 or creates a
suspect classification,' 0 5 courts utilize the more difficult standard
10 6
of strict scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of a statute.
Under the strict scrutiny standard, a court will uphold a statute
only if there is a compelling state interest involved and the court
finds the legislature could not accomplish its goal through a less
restrictive alternative. 10 7 Unlike the rational basis standard,1 0 8 a
court applying strict scrutiny examines whether or not a legislature
has a valid justification for enacting the statute. 10 9 Therefore, a
court will more often find a statute unconstitutional under the
strict scrutiny standard. 110
Both commentators"' and courts' 12 have attempted to articuman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 344-53 (1949) (distinguishing over-inclusive and under-inclusive laws

through examples).
101. See infra note 104 for a discussion of fundamental rights.
102. See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of suspect classifications.
103. LaRouche v. Kezer, 787 F. Supp. 298, 303 (D. Conn. 1992).

104. For purposes of this Note, the author concedes that the Automatic

Transfer Statute affects no fundamental rights. A right that may have
presented an issue, the right to private housing, is not a fundamental right. See
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974); Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth.
v. Van Meter, 412 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ill. 1980).

The Supreme Court has stated that a right must be explicitly or implicitly

guaranteed in the United States Constitution in order for it to be considered a
fundamental right. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 3334 (1973). The Court has found certain rights to be fundamental. See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (right to travel); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (right to marriage and procreation).
105. See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of suspect classes.
106. LaRouche, 787 F. Supp. at 303.
107. Id.
108. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (stating that since the
rational basis standard applied, the Court did not have to explore the justifications given by the state).
109. Shapiro,394 U.S. at 634-38 (1969) (analyzing whether any of the justifications argued by the state would satisfy the compelling interest standard
under the strict scrutiny test).
110. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
burden placed on a state to justify its actions under a strict scrutiny analysis.
111. See Strasser, supra note 83, at 938-39 (stating the different terminology
used by the Supreme Court in determining which groups should receive a
greater degree of protection through the use of a strict scrutiny test); see also
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late the criteria needed to establish a suspect class. Common
themes include whether any history of discrimination exists against
the group, 113 whether the group has some immutable characteristics that define the individuals in the group, 114 and whether the
group has a history of political powerlessness.' 1 5 The Supreme
Court has held that race, 1 16 nationality, 1 17 and alienage"1 8 are suspect classes. Therefore, if the Illinois Automatic Transfer Statute
classifies offenders on the basis of a suspect class, courts must use
the strict scrutiny test. If the statute fails this test, courts will find
the ATS unconstitutional under the equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution1201 9 and
the equal protection provision of the Illinois Constitution.
1.

Inviduous Discrimination

The states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in order to prevent state officials from discriminating on the basis of race. 12 ' A
statute need not be discriminatory solely on its face to violate the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 2 A statTussman & TenBroek, supra note 100, at 356 (stating that articulating a complete list of suspect classifications serves no purpose).
112. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 (arguing suspect classes are groups
that have suffered a history of discrimination, that have some immutable, dis-

tinguishing characteristics, and that must be politically powerless). See also
San Antonio Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28 (arguing that a suspect class requires the

need of protection from the political process since they have long been discrimi-

nated against and have long been politically powerless).

113. San Antonio Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28; High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573.

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880) (indicating blacks
have suspect status).
117. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (indicating nationality is a basis for suspect status).

118. See, e.g., Takashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948)

(indicating alienage is a basis for suspect status).

119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
121. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (discussing the central
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
10 (1967) (discussing the clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
122. There are three ways to establish that a statute creates a suspect classification. 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 88, 1 18.4. First, a party may show the
law creates a classification on its face. Id.; see, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (deter-

mining the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited marriage of interra-

cial couples); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (determining the
constitutionality of a statute which made it illegal for a white person and a nonwhite person of the opposite sex, who were not married to each other, to occupy
the same room at night). Secondly, a party may prove that although a statute is
facially neutral, the person administers the law has done so in a discriminatory
manner. 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 88, 1 18.4; see, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). In Yick Wo, a San Francisco ordinance forbade the
operation of wooden laundries in San Francisco without the consent of the
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ute may be discriminatory solely by its intent or purpose. A court
will apply the strict scrutiny test whenever it believes a legislature
enacted a neutral statute with an underlying discriminatory
123
motive.
In Washington v. Davis,124 the Court clarified the law regarding the proof necessary to prove a claim of invidious racial discrimination. 1 25 In Davis,1 26 the plaintiffs challenged the recruiting
procedures of the Washington, D.C., police departments 12 7 alleging
they discriminated against black applicants desiring to become poboard of supervisors. Id. Although the ordinance was facially neutral, the city
of San Francisco denied every one of over two hundred Chinese applicants that
applied for consent permits. Id. However, all non-Chinese applicants except
one were given consent by the board. Id. A third way in which a party can
establish that a statute creates a suspect classification is by showing that the
legislature enacted the statute for a discriminatory purpose or with discriminatory intent. 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 88, 18.4.

123. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
ways in which a party may prove discriminatory intent.
124. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
125. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (stating that to
prove de jure segregation in a school segregation case, a party must show there
was an intent to segregate); cf. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462
(1972) (stating that in school desegregation cases, a party can prove discrimination by showing the racial impact of the law). In cases involving state action
other than school segregation cases, it seemed as if the court had established
clear law. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the city of Jackson,
Mississippi, closed five swimming pools after the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
had ordered to desegregate them. Id. at 219. Some African-American residents
of Jackson filed suit asking the court to force the city to reopen the pools. Id.

The district court ruled the city did not deny the African-American residents

the equal protection of the laws and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Id. The African-American residents argued to the Supreme Court that
although the impact of the state action was the same for blacks and whites, the
city acted with a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 224. The Court stated that a
legislative act cannot violate the equal protection clause solely because of the
motivation behind those who enacted it. Id. Instead, courts must focus on the
impact of the legislation. Id. at 225. The decision in Thompson closely followed
the reasoning of the Court in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
The O'Brien Court stated that legislative intent is not the critical element in an
equal protection case. Id. at 383. Rather the effect of the legislation is the
relevant factor. Id. at 385. For an interesting look at the question of intent
prior to Washington v. Davis, compare Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An
Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT.
REV. 95 (arguing that a court should look into the motivation behind legislation
rather than avert its eyes to the obvious) with John Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) (arguing
that a court should search for any rationally neutral motivation which may justify the law).
126. 426 U.S. 229.
127. The questioned governmental conduct surrounded the administration of
a police exam in the District of Columbia. Id. at 232. African-American police
applicants claimed the recruiting procedures of the police departments were racially biased. Id. at 233. Specifically, the applicants pointed to Test 21, a written personnel test which tested verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and
comprehension. Id. at 235. Test 21 was a uniform test developed by the Civil
Service Commission. Id.
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lice officers. 128 The procedures were racially neutral on their face
since both black and white applicants were treated identically. 129
The black applicants never claimed the police department enacted
the procedures in order to intentionally discriminate against black
applicants. 130 Their argument rested solely on the fact that the
procedures disqualified a disproportionately higher number of
black applicants than white applicants. 13 1
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 132 held the
disproportionate negative impact of the recruiting procedure on
black applicants was enough to shift the burden to the government
to prove the recruiting procedures were substantially related to job
34
performance. 133 The Unites States Supreme Court reversed.1
The Supreme Court reiterated that it had never held that disparate
impact alone was enough to prove that a neutral law was unconstitutional. 135 However, the Court stated that a court should consider
13 6
the impact along with other relevant factors.
The following term in Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development Corp.,137 the Supreme Court articulated the other
factors needed to prove invidious racial discrimination. 138 In Arlington Heights, a real estate developer attempted to have a zoning
board rezone property he had purchased so he could build low- and
middle-income town houses.' 3 9 The village zoning board refused to
rezone the property for two reasons. 140 First, the board asserted
14
that rezoning threatened the value of surrounding property. '
Secondly, the current zoning served as a buffer between single fam14 2
ily homes and the commercial district.
The real estate developer and three African American individuals brought suit against the Village of Arlington Heights asserting
the zoning board violated their equal protection rights. 143 The Dis128. Id. at 235.
129. Id. at 245.
130. Id. at 235.
131. Four times more black applicants than white applicants were disqualified from employment because they failed to achieve the requisite score of 40
out of 80 on Test 21. Davis, 426 U.S. at 237.
132. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S.
229 (1976).

133. Id.
134. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
135. Id. at 242.
136. The Court did not identify these other relevant factors. Id. But see
Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68 (describing the other relevant
factors).

137. 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977).
138. Id.
139. Id.

140. Id. at 258.
141. Id.
142. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 258.
143. Id. at 258.
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trict Court found that the actions of the village board were not discriminatory.' 4 4 The court held the village had a legitimate motive
for refusing to rezone the property. 145 However, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 146 and held the disproportionate
impact upon blacks, 14 7 along with the segregative history of Northwest Cook County, 148 was enough to shift the burden to the village
the board based its decision upon a compelling
to demonstrate that
14 9
state interest.
The United States Supreme Court reversed 15 0 and reaffirmed
its holding in Davis by stating that disproportionate impact alone
did not violate the equal protection clause. 15 1 A party challenging
144. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F.
Supp. 208, 212 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
145. Id. at 211.
146. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d
409 (7th Cir. 1975).
147. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the refusal to rezone the
property would have an adverse impact on African-Americans. Id. at 413.
Blacks comprised 40% of the population eligible for the low-and middle-income
housing at issue. Id. at 414. Yet, blacks constituted a lower percentage of the
population in general. Id.
148. The Court of Appeals stated that the disproportionate impact upon
blacks alone would not justify application of the strict scrutiny test. Id. However, the court noted the segregative history of Arlington Heights along with
the discriminatory impact on African-Americans, may justify application of the
strict scrutiny standard. Id. The population of Arlington Heights in 1970 was
64,884. Id. at 413. Of these residents, only 27 were African-American. Id. at
414. In addition, the Northwest Cook County area had a population of 219,000,
of which only 170 were African-American residents. Id. At the time, while the
percentage of African-Americans in the Chicago area increased, the percentage
in Northwest Cook county decreased. Id. The Court stated the decision of the
zoning board will effectively bar construction of low- and middle-income housing in Arlington Heights. Id. Additionally, the court determined that if such
housing was not built in Arlington Heights, the segregative policies would continue. Id.
149. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
burden placed on the state to justify its actions under the strict scrutiny
standard.
150. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
151. Id. at 264-65. However, the impact alone may justify application of the
strict scrutiny standard where the state action results in such an obvious pattern of discrimination that it cannot be explained any other way. Id. at 266; see
also Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (noting that in certain situations, the impact of the
state action will be so great in and of itself that it may demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the action).
One example where the impact of state legislation was alone sufficient to
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the law is Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960). In Gomillion, African-American residents claimed they were
being disenfranchised by local act which redefined the voting districts in Tuskegee, Alabama. Id. at 341. The act created a 28 sided figure that excluded all
but four or five of the black voters from the city. Id. The figure, however, did
not exclude any white voters from the city. Id. The Court held that this odd
shaped figure and its resulting impact was enough to prove the act was unconstitutional. Id. at 347. See also supra note 122 for a discussion of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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the action must prove that the official conduct was brought about
due, at least in part, 15 2 to a racially discriminatory intent or purpose. 153 The Court admittedly established a difficult burden for the
challenging party.15 4 However, the Court provided a party with the
evidentiary sources available to prove the subjective intent of the
government official or agency.
In Arlington Heights' 5 5 and subsequent decisions, 15 6 the
United States Supreme Court has enumerated the evidentiary
sources of discriminatory intent or purpose. First, a party may
show a statute has a disproportionate impact. 15 7 Second, a party
However, the Supreme Court has shown that disproportionate impact
alone is almost impossible to prove. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987). In McCleskey, the Georgia Supreme Court convicted the defendant for
armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. Id. at 283-84. After
numerous unsuccessful appeals, McCleskey filed a writ of habeas corpus in the
Federal court. Id. at 285-86. McCleskey claimed the state administered the
capital sentencing process in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 286. McCleskey admitted the Baldus study as evidence. Id. The study analyzed 2,000
murder cases in Georgia during the 1970s. Id. The study indicated that a
defendant charged with killing a white victim is 4.3 times more likely to receive
the death penalty than a defendant who kills a black victim. Id. at 287. Black
defendants were also 1.1 times more likely to receive death sentences than
other defendants. Id. McCleskey argued he was likely to receive the death
penalty since he was a black man and had killed a white victim. Id. The Court
held the statistics were not extreme enough to demonstrate the legislature enacted and maintained the capital punishment statute due to an underlying discriminatory intent. Id. at 298-99.
152. Id. See also Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277
(1979) (stating a court can not measure discriminatory intent since the intent
either influenced the legislature or it did not).
153. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
154. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973) (indicating that due to
the many purposes behind legislation, it is very difficult to find the primary
purpose of the legislature); see also U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968)
(stating that any attempt to determine legislative purpose or motive will lead to
uncertain results).
155. 429 U.S. at 267-68. In Arlington Heights, the Court listed four evidentiary sources that may prove a discriminatory purpose. Id. First, a party may
show the historical background surrounding the action points to a history of
discriminatory treatment. Id. Second, a party may prove intent by observing
the events leading up to the governmental decision. Id. at 268. Third, if the
governmental action was somehow different from its normal procedures, a court
may find that relevant. Id. Finally, a party may prove intent through legislative or administrative history. Id. The Court cautioned that the four factors
were not meant to be exhaustive. Id.
156. After Arlington Heights, the Court indicated a party may prove intent
by showing the adverse impact was foreseeable at the time the legislature enacted the statute. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465-66
(1979). The concept of foreseeability has been adopted by lower courts. Baker
v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571, 585 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Bryan v. Koch,
492 F. Supp. 212, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
157. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. However, there are times where the
discriminatory impact alone will be enough to shift the burden of proof to the
state. For example, a party does not need to show purposeful discriminatory
intent when that party claims discrimination was present in the selection of his
jury. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). The Supreme Court de-
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may attempt to prove that the events leading up to the decision or
1 8
legislation provide some evidence of a discriminatory purpose.
Next, a court may also consider any legislative or administrative
history to ascertain whether a discriminatory underlying purpose
was present.1 5 9 Last, a party may show the resulting impact on a
group was foreseeable at the time the legislature enacted the
law. 160 Therefore, the Supreme Court has provided a party challenging legislation with the evidentiary sources that may prove the
legislature enacted a statute, at least in part, for a discriminatory
purpose.
IV.

APPLYING THE EVIDENTIARY SOURCES TO THE

ATS

This section will address the amended Illinois ATS and will argue that the evidentiary sources show the Illinois Legislature enacted the ATS with a discriminatory purpose or intent. This section
will analyze the legislative history of the statute, 16 1 the impact of
the statute,'162 and the foreseeability of that impact at the time the
legislature enacted the ATS. 163 A court cannot find discriminatory
intent upon the showing of any one of these sources alone. A court
must look to the totality of the evidence in determining the question
cided Castaneda the same year as Arlington Heights. In Castaneda, the Court
held the disproportionate representation of a class in jury selection proceedings
is enough to shift the burden of proof to the state. Id. The 1970 census statistics showed that Hildago County, Texas, was made up of 79.1% Mexican-Americans. Id. at 495. Yet, over an 11 year period, only 39% of those summoned for
grand jury duty were Mexican-American. Id. This alone was enough to shift
the burden of proof to the state to show that discrimination was not involved in
the grand jury selection process. Id. at 497-98. See also Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545 (1967) (holding that the jury selection procedure was unconstitutional
because it resulted in the underrepresentation of blacks on the grand jury and
petit jury).
A party bringing a Title VII discrimination suit also does not have to prove
purposeful discrimination. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In
Griggs, the Court held that under Title VII claims, a party can prove discrimination through the effects or impact of the actions of an employer. Id. Congress
directed the Act to the impact of the action, not the motivation behind it. Id. at
432. The fact that the employer acted with the best intentions is irrelevant. Id.
If the adverse impact is established, the employer has the burden of proving
that the requirement is related to job qualifications. Id. See also Hudson v.
Int'l Machs. Corp., 620 F.2d 351, 355 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that statistical evidence of discriminatory impact is enough to shift the burden of proof to the
employer in claims of discriminatory employment practices).
158. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
159. Id.

160. Penick, 443 U.S. at 464-65.
161. See infra notes 172-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
legislative history of the ATS.
162. See infra notes 187-206 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
discriminatory impact of the ATS.
163. See infra notes 207-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
foreseeability of the impact.
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When one examines the totality of the evi-

dence, it is clear that the Illinois Legislature enacted the ATS with
an underlying discriminatory intent. Therefore, a suspect classification is created, 165 and a court must apply the strict scrutiny test
166
to determine the constitutionality of the statute.
A.

Legislative History

The Supreme Court has cautioned against placing too much
emphasis on statements made by opponents of legislation when trying to determine the meaning of a statute. 167 Rather, if the true
meaning of a statute is not clear, a court should look to the statements of its sponsor. 168 Courts have carried this method of analysis over to determinations of whether a statute violates the equal
protection clause. 169 Thus, a court should look to the statements of
the sponsor in attempting to discern the intent or purpose of a statute. 170 Although the statements of the opponents are not irrelevant, a court should place greater emphasis on the statements of
the sponsor. 171 Nevertheless, attempts to discern the intent of the
ATS by observing the statements of its sponsor are of little value.
The sponsor never gave a straightforward answer when questioned
about the true intent of the statute. 17 2 Thus, the reservations
enunciated by the Supreme Court as to placing too much emphasis
on the statements of opponents to the statute do not present a problem in proving the racially discriminatory intent of the Illinois Legislature in enacting the ATS.
164. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
165. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of suspect classifications.
166. See supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
strict scrutiny standard.

167. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 n.24 (1976) (stating that
opponents of a bill tend to overstate their position); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951) (noting that in order to determine the meaning of a statute, one should not place too much emphasis on the
statements made by the opponents of the legislation).
168. Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 394-95.
169. Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1985) (arguing
that a court should look at statements of the sponsor if the true purpose of a
statute is not clear).
170. Id.
171. In Butts, District Court Judge Brieant held that the New York legislature enacted the run-off statute with a discriminatory motive. Id. Judge Brieant primarily based his decision on the statements made by the opponents of
the legislation. Id. In reversing, the court of appeals held that a statute is not

unconstitutional. solely due to.statements made by opponents during legislative

debates. Id. If the party challenging the legislation had introduced other
sources of evidence to prove discriminatory intent, the Second Circuit Court
may have upheld the decision of the District Court. Id.

172. See infra notes 173-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
legislative debates.
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During debate in the Illinois House of Representatives, opponents of the ATS argued there was some question as to the intent of
the sponsor of the statute. 173 Representative Jones of Cook County
was the first to question the sponsor, Representative DeLeo, as to
the reason why the bill only pertained to public housing. 174 Representative Jones argued the gang problems addressed by the bill
were city-wide problems and not only confined to public housing. 175
Representative Davis of Cook County questioned why a juvenile should receive an enhanced penalty because he lives in public
housing. 176 In addition, she questioned whether the legislature
was attempting to create a different criminal code for those who live
in public housing as opposed to those who live in predominantly
white neighborhoods or suburbs. 17 7 In fact, Representative Davis
came right out and stated that a judge would find the statute unconstitutional, clearly recognizing the underlying intent of the legislature would not be lost on a judge. 178 Thus, statements made by
certain legislators indicate they questioned the intent of the ATS at
the onset of discussions.
Although members of the legislature questioned the true motive of the bill, the sponsor, Representative DeLeo, never clearly addressed the inquiries. 1 79 Instead, he repeatedly stated the bill
173. H.R. Rep. No. 155, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. June 15, 1989).
174. Id. at H155 (statement of Rep. Jones).
175. Id. at H155-56. The sponsor, Representative DeLeo, indicated the purpose of the legislation was to reduce gang activity in and around public housing.
Id. He also stated the bill would be an extension of the 1984 safe school zone
bill. Id. (referringto 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (7)(a) (1992)). The safe school zone bill
automatically transfers juveniles charged with selling drugs on or near school
property to the criminal court. 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (7)(a) (1992). The Illinois
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the safe school zone statute.
People v. M.A., 529 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. 1988).
The Illinois legislature enacted a similar statute in 1986 to fight gang
crime. 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (3.2) (1992). To be eligible for the automatic transfer
to the criminal court under the gang transfer statute, a juvenile must be at
least 15 years old. Id. In addition, the juvenile must commit a forcible felony as
defined under 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (1992). Also, a juvenile court judge must have
previously found the juvenile to be a delinquent. Lastly, the juvenile must commit the felony in furtherance of gang activity. 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (3.2) (1992).
The Illinois Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the gang transfer statute. People v. P.H., 582 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. 1991).
176. H.R. Rep. No. 156, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statement by
Rep. Davis).
177. Id. at H157. Representative Morrow also opposed the bill because he
thought it attempted to single out one group of people. Id. at H161. He stated
that crime is crime regardless of whether the juvenile committed it in a white
suburb or a CHA building. Id. Representative Williams argued the legislature
should not single out a certain group only because the group lives in a place
that most people do not like. Id. at H160.
178. Id. at H158.
179. Id. at H155-59.
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extended the safe school zone protection area i 80 to include public
housing.' 8 1 In doing so, Representative DeLeo claimed residents of
public housing were the greatest victims of gang activity.1 8 2 Aside
from that single statement, Representative DeLeo never explained
the reason for extending the protection zone specifically to include
public housing.183 However, Representative Jones quickly retorted
that the statistics do not prove that assertion.' 8 4 When faced with
the statement that a judge would find the statute unconstitutional,
Representative DeLeo responded very vaguely. 18 5 Representative
DeLeo had many opportunities 8 6 to explain his basis for singling
out public housing in the statute. Had he taken advantage of these
opportunities, he may have alleviated some reservations of his fellow legislators. However, by not addressing these inquiries, it appears that Representative DeLeo had an underlying motive which
he did not want to address. Although a court might consider the
legislative debates enough to show discriminatory intent, the intent
becomes more apparent to the court when it also examines the disproportionate impact upon African-Americans.
B.

DisproportionateImpact on African-Americans

The ATS empowers the juvenile court to automatically transfer
any fifteen or sixteen year old who sells drugs on or near property
i8 7
owned by a public housing agency to the criminal court system.
The legislature concerned itself with gang problems arising in and
around public housing.' 8 8 The Illinois Legislature also addressed
this concern when it enacted a similar statute. The statute enhanced the penalty' 8 9 under the Illinois Criminal Code if an of180. 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (7)(a) (1992). See also supra note 175 for a discussion
of the safe school zone statute.
181. H.R. Rep. No. 152, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statements of
Rep. DeLeo).
182. Id. at H156.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at H158. When Representative Davis stated a judge would find the
ATS unconstitutional, the sponsor responded ambiguously that he did not know
"what's in the appellate court." Id.
186. Representative DeLeo had many opportunities to explain why the legis-

lation singled out public housing. Id. at H155 (following the statements of Rep.
Jones); id. at H156 (following the statement of Rep. Jones); id. (following the
statements of Rep. Davis); id. at H157 (following the statements of Rep. Davis);
id. at H158 (following the statements of Rep. Davis); id. at H159 (during the
closing statement of Rep. DeLeo himself).
187. 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (7)(a) (1992). See also supra notes 55-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the legal system transfers juveniles to the

criminal court system.

188. See supra notes 173-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the

legislative history of the ATS.
189. Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substance Act enumerates the
penalties an offender will receive if convicted of manufacturing or delivering a
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fender is convicted of selling drugs near or on public housing
property. 190 In People v. O.C. Shepard,19 1 the Illinois Supreme
Court found this enhancement statute constitutional as it did not
violate the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 192 or the Illinois Constitution. 19 3 The court stated that the
legislature directed the statute toward those who sell drugs near
public housing, not those who live in public housing. 194 Accordingly, a court should not consider the racial constituency of public
housing when analyzing the constitutionality of an enhancement
statute.
However, in determining the constitutionality of the ATS, a
court must take into consideration the distinction between the ATS
and the enhancement statute in dispute in O.C. Shepard. The ATS
only addresses the conduct of juveniles, 19 5 whereas the enhancement statute principally addresses the conduct of adult offenders. 196 There are many differences between adults and juveniles.
One difference is that, generally, adults are much more mobile than
juveniles. Juveniles are more likely to conduct their activities in
the neighborhoods in which they live. 19 7 If a juvenile living in public housing sells drugs, he will do so in and around his public housing complex. 198 Similarly, a juvenile who lives in the Bridgeport
controlled substance. 720 ILCS 570/401 (1992). The severity of the penalty will
depend on the type of drug involved and the amount of drugs in question. Id.
For instance, if a court convicts an offender for manufacturing or delivering 10
or more grams, but less than 15 grams of heroin, the offender is guilty of a Class
1 felony. Id. § 570/401 (c)(1). As a result, the court may sentence the offender
to the penitentiary for no less than 4 years but no more than 15 years. 730
ILCS 5/5-8-1 (a)(4) (1992). The court may also fine the offender up to $250,000.
720 ILCS 570/401 (c)(1) (1992). If the court convicted this offender of manufacturing or delivering between 10 and 15 grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of
public housing property, the penalty is even greater. 720 ILCS 570/407 (b)
(1992). Under the enhancement statute, the offender is guilty of a Class X felony. Id. The court may then sentence the offender to the penitentiary for not
less than 6 years but not more than 30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (a)(3) (1992).
The court may also fine the offender up to $500,000. 720 ILCS 570/401 (b)
(1992).
190. 720 ILCS 570/407 (1992).
191. People v. O.C. Shepard, 605 N.E.2d 518 (Ill. 1992).
192. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
193. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
194. O.C. Shepard, 605 N.E.2d at 523.
195. 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (7)(a) (1992).
196. At times, the enhancement statute will affect juveniles, such as those
transferred to the criminal court system pursuant to the ATS. In effect, the
juvenile will receive a double enhancement: The transfer to the criminal court
and the increased penalty under the enhancement statute. People v. Lawrence,
No. 92-CR-4907 (Cook County Crim. Div. Jan. 20, 1993), rev'd People v. R.L.,
No. 75081, 75082, 75083, slip op. at 1-8 (Ill. March 29, 1994). Thus, a court may
have to administer harsher penalties since the statute imposes mandatory
prison time. Id. at 3.
197. Id. at 3-4.
198. Id. at 4-5.
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neighborhood and sells drugs will conduct his operation in his
Bridgeport neighborhood. 199 For the most part, juveniles who are
charged with selling drugs near or on public housing live in public
housing. Therefore, it is crucial that a court take into consideration
the racial make-up of the residents of public housing to determine
the discriminatory impact of the ATS.
The breakdown of the residents of the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), a public housing agency, lacks any racial balance
whatsoever. 20 0 In 1991 and 1992, there were 25,357 CHA residents
living in family housing. 20 1 Of those residents, 23,111 (91%) were
African-American, while only 537 (2%) were white. 20 2 When one
contrasts these figures with the overall demographics of Chicago, it
becomes clear that African-Americans are greatly overrepresented
in the CHA. In Chicago, the overall population is 2,783,726, including 1,263,524 (45%) whites, 1,087,711 (39%) African-Americans,
and 432,491 (16%) others. 20 3 Therefore, although African-Americans only comprise 39% of the residents of Chicago, they constitute
91% of the residents of the CHA.
Even though the percentage of African-Americans living in the
CHA is enough to show a sufficient disproportionate impact, the
disproportionate impact becomes even greater when a court looks at
the individuals actually transferred due to the ATS. Since the ATS
went into effect on January 1, 1990,204 thirty-four juveniles of fifteen and sixteen years of age have been transferred to the criminal
court under the ATS. 20 5 Each of the thirty-four juveniles have been

African-Americans. 206 Therefore, the overwhelming statistical evidence shows that the Illinois ATS has a disparate impact on African-Americans. Furthermore, a party challenging the ATS can
show that its impact was foreseeable at the time the legislature enacted the ATS.
C.

ForeseeableDiscriminatoryImpact

In order to show the foreseeability of the discriminatory impact
at the time the legislature enacted the statute, a party must prove
199. Id.

200.

STATISTICAL PROFILE: THE CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, 1991 TO

1992,

in People v. Lawrence, No. 92-CR-4907, at Exhibit B (Cook County Crim. Div.
Jan. 20, 1993).
201. The statistical profile contains two sections: (1) family housing and (2)
senior housing. Id. This Note will focus only on family housing since the ATS
pertains to juveniles, the majority of whom live in family housing.

202. Id. The remainder of the residents consisted of 2% Hispanic, .07%
Asian and Native American, and 5% other. Id.
203. People v. Lawrence, No. 92-CR-4907 (Cook County Crim. Div. Jan. 20,
1993), Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
204. 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (7)(a) (1992).
205. Lawrence, No. 92-CR-4907, at Defense Exhibit 3.
206. Id.
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the legislators recognized the possible consequences of the statute
upon the affected class. 20 7 As with the other evidentiary sources of
discriminatory intent, a party may have to show foreseeability
through circumstantial evidence. 20 8 The most relevant and available evidence a party challenging the ATS can introduce is the racial composition of the CHA.20 9 The statements made by members
of the Illinois House of Representatives during the legislative debates are also relevant. These statements are strong circumstantial evidence that the legislature could foresee the impact upon
African-Americans. 2 10 When a court considers these two forms of
circumstantial evidence, it must find that the legislators were
aware of the foreseeability of the disproportionate impact. The
court must then consider this along with the legislative history and
has resulted to determine the
the disproportionate impact 2which
11
constitutionality of the ATS.
As noted, ninety-one percent of the residents in CHA family
housing are African-American. 2 12 This is in sharp contrast to the
overall population of Chicago. 2 13 Representative DeLeo, the sponsor of the ATS, indicated he was familiar with public housing in
Chicago. 2 14 In fact, he stated he was from the Northwest Side of
Chicago and his statements show he was cognizant of public housing complexes throughout the city. 2 15 Thus, a court could infer
Representative DeLeo knew of the racial imbalance of the CHA.
In addition, statements made by other legislators during the
House debates are also relevant. These statements indicate that
some legislators anticipated the ATS would affect those who live in
public housing much more than those who do not. 2 16 Representative Williams of Cook County opposed the bill because he thought
the ATS singled out those who lived in public housing. 2 17 Representative Morrow of Cook County also opposed the bill since he be207. Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571, 587 (M.D. Fla. 1986)
(stating a party can show discriminatory purpose through the foreseeability of
the disproportionate impact upon the class).
208. Id. at 586.
209. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
racial composition of the CHA.
210. See infra notes 173-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
statements made during debates in the Illinois House of Representatives.
211. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264 (1977).
212. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
racial composition of the CHA.
213. See supra note 203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the racial
composition of the City of Chicago.

214. H.R. Rep. No. 157, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statements of
Rep. DeLeo).
215. Id.
216. Id. at H155-61.
217. Id. at H159-160 (statement of Rep. Williams). Rep. Williams stated the
legislature should not single out one category of people only because they live in
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lieved it would provide harsher penalties for those who lived in
public housing. 2 18 The strongest statement came from Representative Davis of Cook County who argued the ATS actually enacted a
2 19
separate criminal code for those who live in public housing.
These statements indicate that some of the legislators foresaw the
discriminatory impact of the ATS.
Representative DeLeo responded that the ATS provided
harsher penalties for those who sell drugs on public housing property, not those who live in public housing. 220 However, in defending a constitutional attack on the ATS, Representative DeLeo
cannot argue the impact of the statute was unforeseeable. He knew
of the racial imbalance in the CHA and his fellow legislators impressed upon him the notion that the ATS would overwhelmingly
affect those who lived in public housing. As a result, the legislature
could foresee the discriminatory impact the ATS would have upon
African-Americans. A court analyzing the constitutionality of the
ATS must take into account the impact itself, its foreseeability and
22 1
the legislative history.
As a result, a party challenging the constitutionality of the ATS
can prove the legislature enacted the statute with a discriminatory
intent or purpose. 22 2 The legislature created a classification on the
basis of race. Since race is a suspect classification, 22 3 a court must
apply the strict scrutiny test 224 to the ATS. Therefore, the state
has the burden of proving the legislature narrowly tailored the ATS
to serve a compelling state interest. 22 5 If the state does not meet
this burden, a court must find the ATS unconstitutional.
an area of poverty. Id. He also stated the legislature should not create special

categories of crime for certain citizens. Id.
218. 86th Gen. Ass. H161 (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statement of Rep. Morrow). Rep. Morrow argued the legislature should not single out public housing
since gangs and drugs are a problem in almost every neighborhood. Id.

219. Id. at H157 (statement of Rep. Davis). Representative Davis questioned

the sponsor about whether the legislature was creating a different criminal
code for those who live in public housing. Id. She also argued that crime is
crime regardless of where it is committed. Id.
220. Id. at H156 (statement of Rep. DeLeo). Representative DeLeo argued
that the ATS is directed toward those selling drugs on public housing property,
not those who live in public housing. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court followed
the same reasoning in upholding a similar statute. People v. O.C. Shepard, 605
N.E.2d 518 (Ill. 1992).
221. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
267-68 (1977).
222. See supra notes 173-221 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
legislative history of the ATS, its discriminatory impact, and the foreseeability
of its impact.
223. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of suspect classifications.
224. See supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
strict scrutiny test.
225. See infra notes, 226-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the

burden placed on the state.
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D.

The Response of the State

Once the party challenging the ATS establishes a prima facie
case of racially discriminatory intent through the use of the legislative history, the discriminatory impact, and the foreseeability of
that impact, the burden shifts to the state. The state must then
prove the legislature enacted the ATS due to a compelling state interest. 2 26 In addition, the state must prove the legislature could

not have accomplished that interest through a less restrictive alternative. 22 7 Courts have placed this onerous burden on states since
race, or any other suspect classification, is seldomly related to the
achievement of a legitimate state interest. 2 28 More often, the creation of a suspect classification by the legislature will reflect prejudice on the part of the legislature. 22 9 Therefore, the state has the
burden of proving that the legislature enacted the ATS due to a
compelling state interest, and that the ATS is the least restrictive
means available.
The state must first show the legislature enacted the statute
due to a compelling state interest. 230 The sponsor of the ATS, Representative DeLeo, stated the purpose of the ATS was to decrease
gang activity in public housing. 23 1 Furthermore, he stated the legislature needed to target public housing since the residents of public housing are the greatest victims of gang activity. 23 2 Therefore,
the legislature clearly expressed that its purpose for enacting the
ATS was to reduce rampant criminal gang activity in public
housing.
Any party challenging the ATS would acknowledge the state
has a compelling interest in reducing gang activity and protecting
society from criminal activity. However, the ATS fails to reduce
gang activity in general 23 3 or protect society as a whole. 2 34 Instead,
the ATS attempts to reduce gang activity only in and around public
226. LaRouche v. Kezer, 787 F. Supp. 298, 303 (D. Conn. 1992).
227. Id.
228. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating that race, alienage, and national origin are seldom related to a legitimate

state interest).
229. Id. The Court stated that when a law creates a suspect classification, it
often reflects prejudice. Id. Similarly, it shows the legislature believes those in
suspect classes are inferior to those not in such classes. Id.
230. Larouche, 787 F. Supp. at 303.

231. H.R. Rep. No. 152, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statement of
Rep. DeLeo) (stating that public housing may be the greatest recruitment area
for gangs).
232. Id. at H156 (statement of Rep. DeLeo). Representative Jones asked
Representative DeLeo why the ATS focuses on public housing. Id. Representative DeLeo responded that people in public housing tend to be the greatest victims of gang activity. Id.
233. For a statute addressing gang activity in general, see the gang transfer
statute, 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (3.1) (1992).

234. 705 ILCS 405/5-4

(7)(a) (1992).
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housing and to protect those who live in public housing. 2 35 The
racially motivated belief of the legislature that more criminal gang
activity occurs in public housing than elsewhere will not convince a
236
court that a compelling state interest is present.
Nevertheless, even if a court determines a compelling state interest exists, the state cannot satisfy the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test. The state must also show that the legislature could
not have accomplished that interest through a less restrictive alternative. 23 7 The legislature must have enacted the legislation in an
attempt to achieve a narrowly tailored purpose. 238 Therefore, the
state will fail to meet its burden of proof if a party can prove that
the Illinois Legislature could have achieved its purpose of reducing
gang activity in public housing through a less restrictive alternative. If the state fails to meet its burden, a court must find the ATS
unconstitutional.
There are two ways in which the Illinois legislature could have
enacted the ATS in a less restrictive manner. First, the legislature
could have enacted the ATS to require juvenile court judges to automatically transfer any fifteen or sixteen year old charged with violating Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substance Act 2 39 to the
criminal court system. Through this method, the legislature would
accomplish its goal of getting tough on crime. 2 40 In addition, the
statute would not target only public housing. Rather, it would treat
everyone charged with the same offense equally. 24 1 Thus, the legis235. Id. (7)(a).
236. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431 (1984) (stating that although the
Constitution cannot control private bias, it likewise does not tolerate bias). See
also Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963). In Watson, the plaintiff
brought an action requesting the court to direct the city to desegregate parks
and other public facilities. Id. The state argued it needed a long period of time
to desegregate the parks and public facilities since it feared public unrest would
increase when the desegregation occurred. Id. at 535. The Supreme Court
ruled the vague assertions of fear and violence asserted by the state were not
enough to overcome the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. Id. at 539. The
state was unable to demonstrate that any violent disturbances had occurred as
a result of the desegregation. Id. at 536.
237. LaRouche v. Kezer, 787 F. Supp. 298, 303 (D. Conn. 1992).
238. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 437 U.S. 432,440 (1985) (holding the state must prove the statute is suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest); F. Buddie Contracting Co. v. City of Elyria, 773 F. Supp. 1018,
1030 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (ruling the state must prove the ordinance is narrowly
tailored to achieve its purpose).
239. 720 ILCS 570/401 (1992).
240. S. reg. 80-81, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Marovitz). Senator Marovitz stated the legislature was sending a message by
enacting the ATS. Id. According to Senator Marovitz, the legislature told everyone that it was getting tough on crime. Id.
241. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that when a
law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed the same offense, the
law is as discriminatory as if it had selected a particular group for oppressive
treatment).
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lature could have addressed the compelling state interest in a less
restrictive manner.
Second, the Illinois legislature could have addressed its perceived need to control gang activity in public housing in a less restrictive manner. Instead of automatically transferring juveniles
charged with selling drugs near public housing, 2 42 the legislature
could have allowed juvenile court judges to take that into consideration when making their waiver decision.2 43 Thus, the juvenile
would not automatically lose the protection of the juvenile court
system. 24 4 The legislature would allow the juvenile court judge to
use his discretion in determining whether the juvenile court system
is the better forum for the juvenile. Therefore, the legislature could
have addressed the perceived state interest and still have enacted a
less restrictive statute.
At the time of the enactment of the ATS, members of the Illinois Legislature, 24 5 and the Governor of Illinois 24 6 advocated leaving the discretion to the juvenile court judges. Representative
Young of Cook County urged the legislature to grant juvenile court
judges the power to determine whether the juvenile system could
better rehabilitate juveniles. 24 7 However, even though Senator
Jones stated the importance of getting tough on crime, 248 he argued
that juvenile court judges should look at each juvenile charged with
selling drugs near public housing individually and make a waiver
24 9
determination on a case-by-case basis.
2 50
Former Illinois Governor James Thompson vetoed the ATS.
Although he supported enhanced penalties for those charged with
selling drugs near public housing, he did not support the automatic
transfer provision. 25 1 He stated that many juveniles are capable of
242. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislative waiver.
243. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text for a discussion ofjudicial
waiver.
244. See supra note 73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the protection afforded a juvenile under the juvenile court system.
245. H.R. Rep. No. 153-54, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statement
of Rep. Young that the legislature should leave the waiver decision to the juvenile court judges); S. Reg. 82, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1989) (statement
of Sen. Jones that the legislature should not create blanket laws, but instead, it
should allow juvenile court judges to make waiver decisions on a case-by-case

basis).
246. J. SENATE 8589 (Sept. 6, 1989).
247. H.R. Rep. No. 153-54, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statement

of Rep. Young).
248. S. Reg. 82, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Jones).
249. Id.
250. J. SENATE 8588 (Sept. 6, 1989).

251. Id. at 8589. The Governor stated that he strongly supported the enhanced penalties for manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance on
public housing property. Id. However, he stated he did not support, nor ap-
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rehabilitation. 25 2 In addition, he noted that Illinois already has
one of the harshest automatic transfer provisions in the country. 25 3
The Governor believed juvenile court judges should retain discretion and the court should make the waiver determination on a caseby-case basis. 25 4 However, the Illinois Legislature was able to override the veto of Governor Thompson. 2 55 Nonetheless, the statements of the Governor and the legislature indicate the legislature
could have addressed the perceived state interest through a less
restrictive alternative. Thus, the state cannot meet its burden of
proof. Therefore, Judge Getty properly ruled the ATS is unconstitutional in that it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 2 56 and the
257
equal protection provision of the Illinois Constitution.
CONCLUSION

The juvenile court system has experienced many changes since
the 1960s. 2 58 These changes have made the juvenile court system
similar to that of the adult criminal court system. Some commentators have even advocated abolishing the juvenile system altogether
believing the need for seperate systems no longer exists. 25 9 However, the juvenile court system does cloak the juvenile with certain
protections he will not have under the criminal system. 260 Consequently, the decision of a legislature to enact an automatic transfer
statute will have a far reaching effect on juveniles.
The Illinois Legislature enacted the ATS to control gang
prove of the automatic transfer of'juveniles charged with that offense. Id. Governor Thompson stated that some juveniles are capable of and receptive to
rehabilitation. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. The Governor stated juvenile court judges should make waiver decisions on a case-by-case basis. Id. The court system should transfer some
juveniles. Id. However, the juvenile court system could handle many juveniles
much better. Id. The juvenile court system has some "dispositional options"
that may not be available under the criminal court system. Id.

255. S. Reg. 86, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1989) (statement of Sen.
D'Arco, presiding officer). The Senate voted 35 to 1 to override the veto of Gov-

ernor Thompson. Id. The law only required a 60% vote to override the veto of
the Governor. Id. See also H.R. Rep. No. 77, 86th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. Nov. 1,
1989) (statement of Speaker Giglio). The House voted 91 to 12 to override the

veto of Govenor Thompson. Id.
256. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
257. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.

258. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
changes in the juvenile court system since the 1960s.
259. See Ainsworth, supra note 15.

260. See supra note 73 for a discussion of the protections a juvenile loses

when the juvenile court transfers the juvenile to the criminal court system.
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problems in public housing. 2 6 1 Yet, the legislature was unable to
explain the basis for according special treatment to conduct in and
around public housing. Judge Getty ruled the ATS was unconstitutional.2 6 2 The legislative history, discriminatory impact, and foreseeability of that impact prove Judge Getty properly found the ATS
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 26 3 and the equal protection provision of the Illinois Constitution. 26 4 Therefore, the Illinois Legislature should repeal the 1989
Amendment. This revision would return the statute to its prior
purpose of attacking drugs and gang activity around schools
only. 2 6 5 Only after the Illinois legislature amends the Automatic
266
Transfer Statute will it be constitutional.
Martin J. O'Hara

261. H.R. Rep. No. 155, 8th Ill. Leg. (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statement of
Rep. DeLeo).
262. People v. Lawrence, No. 92-CR-4907 (Cook County Crim. Div., Jan. 20,
1993), rev'd People v. R.L., No. 75081, 75082, 75083, slip op. at 1-8 (Ill. March

29, 1994).
263. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
264. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
265. The complete text of the proposed revised statute is in the Appendix to
this Note.
266. See People v. M.A., 529 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. 1988).
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PROPOSED AuToMATIc TRANSFER STATUTE

(7)(a) The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5-3 of this
Act shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was
at least 15 years of age and who is alleged to have committed an
offense under Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substance Act
when the offense occurred on or within one thousand (1,000) feet of
the property on any school. Property of any school shall include
those portions of any building, park, stadium or other structure or
grounds which were, at the time of the offense, being used for an
activity sponsored by or through a school. School property shall
also include any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a
school to transport students to or from school or a school related
activity. These provisions will be in effect regardless of the time of
day or the time of year. For purposes of this Section, school is defined as any public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college, or university. These offenses and all
felonies or misdemeanors charged in the complaint which are based
on the same act or transaction shall be prosecuted under the Illinois
267
Controlled Substances Act.

267. This proposed statute is a combination of the Illinois Automatic Transfer Statute, 705 ILCS 405/5-4 (7)(a) (1992), and the Idaho Automatic Transfer
Statute, IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A (Supp. 1993). The proposed statute allows the
legislature to protect students during any school activity.

